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TheProblem
Weekly hours may lead employment at cyclical turning points because
(1) they can be more quickly and conveniently adjusted; (2) changes in
the length of workweek do not commit a company to a course of expansion
or contraction; (3) at business cycle peaks, reduction of overtime saves
costs by avoiding premium payments; (4) reduction of overtime enhances
productivity since overtime hours tend to be less productive, and liberal
use of overtime may encourage "drag-out" of work; (5) at troughs, fuller
employment of that part of the work force which has been on an involun-
tary part time basis provides cost advantages as compared with the em-
ployment and training of new help; (6) maintenance of a "stable" work
force is preferable from the viewpoint of employee morale; finally (7)
work-sharing in times of receding demand and the converse sharing of
increasing work opportunities is regarded as good public relations policy
and frequently made part of union agreements. We have also suggested
that the differing impact of the determinants listed under (3) and (5)
might help to explain the longer leads of hours at business cycle peaks as
compared to troughs.
As plausible as these reasons may appear, they leave some basic
questions unanswered. Why should employment—and manhours—con-
tinue to rise, near peaks, after hours have been reduced? An analysis of
labor turnover rates reveals that after hours have started to drop, near
peaks, the hiring rate exceeds the voluntary qUit rate for a while, thus
bringing continued advances in employment. But why should manage-
ment, once it decides to reduce hours, be unable to reduce hiring enough
to exceed voluntary quits? Perhaps the picture we get from the aggregative
accounts does not really reflect the experience of individual plants and
companies but is merely a result of the aggregation process. This problem
must be examined before further progress can be expected in explaining
the lead of weekly hours over employment.
Two Models
In principle, the average lead of weekly hours over employment (and over
91manhours) which was shown to characterize industry aggregates could
occur in any of three ways: (1) as the result of similar relationships on
the plant level, (2) as the result of the aggregation process, and in spite
of fairly simultaneous turns in hours and employment on the plant level,
and (3) as any combination of both.
The model describing the first situation is extremely simple. It can be





Inboth plants, constituting the "industry," hours lead employment, and
employment continues its prior movement, after the turn in hours. As a
result, hours in the "industry" lead.




































92In this case hours and employment in each plant turn cyclically at the
same time. The earlier turn of weekly hours in the aggregate is brought
about by the fact that in Plant A—the plant with the earlier turns—the
change in the length of the workweek, shortly after the cyclical turn, is
relatively sharp. Thus it dominates the movement of the average. Once a
plant decides on a change in the direction of labor input, it would pref-
erably—though not exclusively—make the change by cutting (or expand-
ing) hours, for reasons cited earlier in explanation of the lead of aggregate
hours. Under these circumstances, the movements of hours shortly after
cyclical turns may be sharper than those shortly before turns. The result
would be the observed lead of average weekly hours over employment in
industry aggregates.
Some Statistical
What empirical evidence can we marshal in support of either hypothesis?
Let us first investigate the possibility that the lead of hours over employ-
ment is characteristic not only of industry aggregates but also of plant
statistics.
Hours and employment statistics are not generally published for indi-
vidual plants. In fact, the collecting agencies of the government are pre-
vented, by strict disclosure rules, from making individual plant information
available to the student. However, through the generous cooperation of the
Bureau of Labor Statistics we were able to study the sequence of turning
points of hours relative to employment in 20 unidentified manufacturing
plants, for the period 1947 through 1957. These plants were selected
according to certain broad specifications: (1) a relatively large size (by
standards of the industry to which they belong); (2) a fair homogeneity
of product (such as would be found in plate glass or portland cement, or
certain types of work clothing); and (3) availability of data on weekly
hours and employment for all the years 1947-1957.
Unfortunately there was too much seasonal variation in the charted
raw data to determine turning points with much assurance; and there was
too much irregular behavior for either satisfactory seasonal adjustments
or cyclical analysis after such adjustments. Thus twelve months moving
averages of the data were used to eliminate, in a rough way, seasonal and
random movements. It was assumed that the expected shifting of turning
points would not introduce any systematic bias.
The data show conclusively that the lead of turns in weekly hours
over those in employment is characteristic of labor input behavior not
only at the industry but also at the plant level. Timing comparisons were


































































































































































































































































































































































































































4regardless of whether these turns could also be related to changes in
general business conditions. Altogether, the information for 20 plants pro-
duced 74 comparable turning points. Of these, 62 showed leads, 6 lags,
and 6 coincidences of turns in weekly hours and employment. The preva-
lence of leads is slightly stronger at peaks than at troughs (see Table 24).
The regularity with which turns in hours precede turns in employment
does not, of course, imply a tight covariation of the two labor input factors.
Chart13
Weekly Hours and Employment of Production Workers
in Four Manufacturing Plants, 1947-1 957




1947'48 '49'50 '51 '52
Shadedareas represent business cycle contractions, according to NBER chronology.
Dots identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles.Although hours led employment whenever turns corresponded, not all
specific turns could be matched. Only 67 per cent of the specific turns in
hours and 79 per cent of those in employment could be matched with turns
in the other variable. Some typical situations are illustrated by Chart 13,
which contains simplified versions1 of weekly hours and employment vari-
ations in four plants of the sample. For Plant I, even brief intracyclical
variations of hours and employment are closely related, with regular leads
of hours over employment. In Plant II, we find good correspondence of
hours and employment as well as close correspondence of changes in labor
input to those in general business conditions. Plant III shows some re-
latable turns, but also reveals a good deal of independent fluctuation of
hours and employment. In Plant IV, finally, related movements are totally
absent. Plant III illustrates the conditions found most frequently in the
20-plant sample: a fair degree of independence between hours and employ-
ment, some clearly matched turns, and the typical lead of hours wherever•
the turns can be matched.
The prevalence of leads of hours over employment, on a plant basis,
does not, however, strip the second hypothesis of all explanatory value.
One piece of evidence in its support—as a necessary though not sufficient
condition—would be a clear tendency of weekly hours to show steeper
changes shortly after than before turning points. In the absence of strong
trends, such behavior could occur at peaks as a consequence of the rela-
tively longer duration of expansions compared to contractions. At troughs,
this general phenomenon would operate in the opposite direction. We
cannot claim to have examined the available evidence bearing on this
issue. But inspection of the behavior of weekly hours in the 20 sample
plants does not suggest that hours have significantly steeper amplitudes
briefly after than before their turns.
Our present conclusion is that the lead of turns in weekly hours over
those in employment, as displayed by aggregated industry information,
must be traced predominantly to a parallel phenomenon on the plant level.
If the industry lead is occasionally the result of differential amplitudes in
components, this must play a minor role.
Managerial Considerations
We can now formulate our question regarding the lead of hours over
employment more pointedly: "Why do managers of individual plants
cause or permit employment as well as total manhours to continue to
'Detail between turning points was omitted in order to prevent identification of
plants.
96expand (or contract) after they have cut (or increased) the length of the.
workweek?" Perhaps the managers themselves can enlighten us about the
considerations which underlie their actions. Interviews with about a dozen
plant and industrial relations managers provided the following interpre-
tation.2
Briefly, existing trends in employment and manhours apparently
continue, after weekly hours have changed direction, as a result of the
momentum of prevailing employment policies. While decisions on over-
time, affecting the length of the workweek, are typically made on the
foreman level in response to changes in current workloads, decisions to
change hiring policies are made at the plant management or even higher
levels in the corporate hierarchy. Changes in weekly hours come about
as the result of fluctuations in current workloads; cyclical changes in
employment are the result of policy decisions based on anticipated work-
loads. Hours changes, as they occur in the neighborhood of cyclical turns,
are regarded as short term adjustments of labor input, employment changes
as long term adjustments. The latter presume some revisions in the outlook
for the business or plant, division or company; they require the accumu-
lation of internal and external evidence that such revision is warranted.
En the meantime established policies stand.
Let us look at the process of labor input management in greater detail.
Labor Input Adjustments at Peaks
In the early stages of the cyclical decline of average weekly hours, the
reduction of overtime plays a large role. Decisions on overtime hours are
often made by foremen or supervisors who are under general instruction
to hold down overtime hours.3 How vigorously these instructions are car-
ried out depends on circumstances such as the importance of labor costs
2A dozen interviews can scarcely be regarded as constituting an adequate sampling
procedure, nor were they formal enough to permit quantification or even classifi-
cation of the responses. Thus the following report cannot be more than an
impressionistic summary of these conversations. In any case, the various explana-
tions given by the managers interviewed require further testing. We present, how-
ever, the results of our improvised inquiry with the hope that they may be a
stimulus to discussion and further research.
cost and productivity considerations making such action desirable are well
known. Overtime is not only expensive but also tends to be less productive. Some-
times other aspects were mentioned. Regular overtime leads to "stretch-out" of
work during regular hours, in order to obtain more work at premium pay. Fur-
thermore, sustained overtime leads to an upward revision of levels and standards
of living. On occasion, it tends to "oblige" the company to perpetuate these
earning opportunities; or if this cannot be done, as in cyclical contractions, the
earnings adjustment are sharp and may affect morale.
97in the operations of the firm, the profitability of the work involved, the
urgency of the delivery date, the service orientation of the firm and mana-
gerial discipline. In any case, near peaks in general business conditions,
workloads tend to be heavy, deliveries urgent, the labor market tight, and
recourse to longer hours least avoidable. The foremen request additional
help but frequently have to wait for it—and that is the explanation they
give if taken to task for the high costs of hours at premium rates.
Suppose now that the demand, originating from the sales department,
decreases somewhat. These decreases will take pressure off the production
department and will first result in a reduction of the costly overtime and
other premium pay hours (such as Sunday and holiday work), thereby
reducing the length of the average workweek. At the same time, hiring
will be less aggressive. In particular, the hiring for the specific purpose
of avoiding overtime will be stopped or at least reduced. However, the
fact that overtime hours are cut will not necessarily induce foremen to
cancel their requests for additional help. They have no reason to assume
that the reduction of pressure is more than temporary. Having just reached
the desirable condition of more "normal" operations, they will not want
to jeopardize this state of affairs. For some hard-to-get personnel they
may have been clamoring for a long time and will certainly not withdraw
their demands. There may be some lay-offs of temporary labor. But so
far as work is concerned, there is characteristically still quite some backlog
and there are many tasks that were postponed in order to give priority to
urgent orders. And the labor market, on the whole, is still very tight.
Voluntary quits will typically be replaced, and the requisitions of old
standing will be kept active. If hiring is done to cut overtime, recruiting
and training costs have to be considered. But recruiting costs are fixed
costs largely aheady incurred; and training costs, spread over any pro-
longed employment of new workers, tend to be below overtime costs. For
many new jobs, training periods are short, trained workers can be hired,
and even untrained workers will soon begin to produce—albeit at low
productivity. In general, the breaking-in costs are not regarded as a major
deterrent to replacing overtime by regular workers. From the foreman's
point of view, there is no reason to stop normal recruiting. At this stage
of development, the more cautious hiring and the mild rise in lay-offs
effects employment levels less than the decrease in voluntary quits. The
short term decisions, on the foreman level, do not halt the continuous rise
of employment.
How about the higher management levels? For the general reasons
outlined at the beginning of this section, hiring policies will be changed
only if there is clear indication that business has taken a turn for the
98worse. Management cannot change expectations and policies with every
little wiggle in the order or sales curve. Internal and external evidence
must be strong enough to justify a turn-about. This takes time. Informa-
tion on orders, sales, backlogs, capacity utilization, labor costs, factory
margins and profits are part of the internal evidence. Industry statistics,
trade opinion, general economic indicators and business forecasts are
examples of the external evidence considered. Eventually, after modifying
their outlook, businessmen will decide to retrench and in this process
change employment policies drastically. In the meantime, the old policies
stand.
It is essential to qualify this somewhat simplified account. If the
projected workload of a plant, or section of a plant, requires less than
the present contingent of workers, foremen as well as higher management
will of course try to reduce the payroll, without waiting for signs of a
companywide, industrywide, or nationwide recession. However, manage-
ment may try to find spots for these workers elsewhere—perhaps as
replacements for voluntary quits, retirements, etc. It will not, character-
istically, broaden such action into a policy change until the conviction
grows that retrenchment on a larger scale is required.
Other complications beset the contraction of employment. If the
adjustment requires not only reduction of hiring, but actual lay-offs,
company policies may be circumscribed by collective agreements. In
many cases dismissals of workers with seniority of, say, two and more
years, may be permitted only after the workday is cut for all, or after
consultation with the union. Even if lay-offs are decided upon, seniority
rules may delay the adjustment of employment. A worker whose job is
to be abolished may have the right to "bump" a worker with lower
seniority in the same or another department or even plant. The trans-
ferred worker has to learn the new job—typically from the replaced man.
This leads to double-employment, albeit for a limited period, at the very
time that a policy of labor input contraction is pursued. The significance
of this kind of "double employment" will become fully apparent if it is
realized that "bumping" is a chain-reaction procedure and that several
"bumps" may be involved in the cancellation of a job held by a man with
high seniority.
Finally, the mechanisms of decision making vary between large and
small plants and among individual plants of the same size group. Fore-
men have different degrees of authority in different plants. Thus the
explanation of the lead of hours should not be conceived in terms of
conflicting policies at different management levels, but rather as the result
of differences in the means of short term longer term adjustments.
99These seem characteristically "out of phase" during a brief period pre-
ceding employment peaks.
Labor Input Adjustments at Troughs
What is the typical process in the neighborhood of troughs in business
activity? Again, a variety of circumstances and of managerial considera-
tions play a role in causing average hours to turn in advance of employ-
ment and manhours. Near the trough of specific cycles in a given industry
or company, there is the likelihood of short time and of underutilization
of manpower even during the hours of employment.4 Suppose orders
increase and production schedules are stepped up. Some of this may be
possible without measurable adjustment of labor input—by just "taking
up the slack." Some further increase in output may be achieved by extend-
ing the workweek of those presently employed to full time or, for a limited
period, even beyond full time hours. If more men are needed for a
particular job, there may be an attempt to transfer workers from other
jobs or departments overstaffed in relation to the available work. During
this period of readjustment, lay-offs will be reduced and hiring will be
done where the demand for labor input cannot be met by the existing
work force.
At the start, any rehiring or new hiring will be cautious and will not
exceed total separations (be they for economic or personal reasons). Thus
employment will continue to decline. Why are supervisors and managers
inclined to step up hiring only cautiously? There is the need to increase
the hours of those who accepted short-time in lieu of lay-off S.Theremay
be union agreements regulating the sequence of the build-up, and requir-
ing that normal hours be introduced for the employed workers of specified
seniority before new labor is hired. Also, guaranteed wage provisions and
the experience rating aspects of unemployment insurance contributions
make it desirable not to "commit" the company more deeply than neces-
sary. And the initial costs of hiring, training and supervising new workers
must enter entrepreneurial considerations to some extent. Finally, the
retrenchment policies instituted by management during the contraction
are likely to be still in force—even after the hiring rate has turned up and
the lay-off down. These policies demand lay-offs of dispensable workers
and a moratorium on new hires to the best of the supervisors' abilities.
Why does management not change its policy promptly? Again we
must realize that we are close to the trough in business conditions. Thus
underutilization is particularly pronounced in case of indirect labor but also,
in many circumstances, discernable in case of production workers.
100the needs for defensive managerial policies are stifi pressing. And the
disadvantages of liberal hiring at this stage, (and its effects on labor costs,
morale, experience rating and so forth) are, of course, also considered
above the foreman level. It should further be considered that labor is
plentiful during those times, and although some companies use this situa-
tion to build some "inventory" of desirable workers, this practice plays a
minor role in the general state of the labor market. Management wifi
resume expansionist policies only when it is firmly convinced that the turn
has come. And that may take several months.
Again, these general conditions may be modified by a host of special
circumstances. Large orders in one or the other department, the promise
of early delivery in order to obtain a given contract, a promising outlook
for specific products, production processes requiring new stocks, excessive
lay-offs or postponed hiring during the preceding period, collective agree-
ments specifying a lower normal workweek—these and other circum-
stances may easily interfere with the neat and orderly sequence of turns
in weekly hours and employment, which we are so assiduously explaining.
But the wide variety of business circumstances is well recognized. The
host of modifying circumstances is reflected in the fact that in 33 per cent
of our observations on individual plants, cyclical turns of weekly hours
could not even be matched with those of employment. And in some of the
matched turns, weekly hours did in fact not lead employment. For a
substantial majority of cyclical experiences, however, our account should
provide a satisfactory explanation.
Will Hours Continue to Lead?
We have observed that, in the past, cyclical turns in the length of the
average workweek showed a good record of preceding turns in employ-
ment and in general business conditions. In the earlier sections of this
paper we investigated the reasons for this phenomenon. Let us see
whether these insights permit observations on the likelihood that weekly
hours may preserve their indicator characteristics in the future.
The long-term trends toward lower weekly hours and higher employ-
ment levels may be expected to continue into the future. These trends
would tend to hasten peaks in hours and delay those in employment;
conversely, they would delay troughs in hours and hasten those in employ-
ment. In the first instance this would lengthen, in the second shorten the
lead of hours over employment. However, our findings are based on a
period during which these long-term trends toward higher employment
levels and a shorter workweek were already in operation, and there is no
reason to assume that their impact will be fundamentally changed. Thus
101we do not anticipate that these forces will produce any basic change in the
relation of hours and employment turns.
The recent growth of a number of institutional arrangements also
bears on our question. Guaranteed annual wage agreements, union rules
on the mechanics of lay-offs and rehiring, protection of seniority rights,
and interest in retirement benefit funds are examples of such develop-
ments. The main tendency of these institutional arrangements is to
increase employment security and to reduce labor turnover. Hence, varia-
tions in labor input—to the extent that they are all affected at all by these
developments—will be shifted toward a manipulation of the length of the
workweek rather than the number of workers. This will tend to perpetuate
the lead of average hours over employment. However, some arrangements
will not have this effect. Supplementary unemploymcnt benefits are an
example. During the recent recession, the automobile workers preferred
lay-offs of low seniority to a short workweek fOr all workers. Combined
unemployment insurance and supplementary unemployment benefits
assured a fairly high income for those .layed off; the earnings of the high
seniority workers were protected; and the overall income for the group
as a whole was higher than it would have been otherwise. Assuming the
perpetuation of present rules, the spread of supplementary unemployment
benefits in the future would tend to damp the cyclical fluctuations of the
average workweek.
Technological progress in the direction of greater automation may
affect the fluctuation of hours. Highly mechanized around-the-clock
operations, such as now exist in certain process industries, might be
expected to impose an increasing rigidity on the manipulation of the work-
day. However, this does not necessarily imply rigidity in the length of
the workweek per worker. Shifts can still be lengthened or shortened and
a smaller number of shifts distributed among a given number of workers
without disrupting the continuous process. The overall effect of automa-
tion, however, may be in the direction of less flexibility, since changes in
the, number of days worked and in the length of shifts are managerially
cumbersome—certainly more so than arrangements for overtime or short
time under less rigid operating conditions.
Will progress in management techniques affect the lead of weekly
hours? The corporate officers interviewed expressed some interest in
setting standards for decisions on adjustment of labor input. We learned
of attempts to develop formal standards, ranging from a simple rule of
thumb to more sophisticated approaches. A simple approach might be
illustrated by the rule: "If 50hoursovertime at a semi-skilled occupation
are required for more than six weeks, we will hire an extra man." In
102another case, there were experiments to base hiring (and lay-off) deci-
sions on a combination of five or six controlling factors such as length of
prospective employment (or dearth of work), level of skill, degree of
specialization and training time. But it was evident that rules or formulae
were rarely relied upon in practice, presumably because of the many
complicating factors and special circumstances. Frequently, decisions may
be heavily affected by circumstances that do not lend themselves to
formalized consideration; an example is the need of an important cus-
tomer for a particular job at a particular time. This seems to set limits
to formalizing the decisions on overtime versus hiring—and thus on a
mechanical management of the hours-employment composition of labor
mput.
One more factor which should be considered is improved business
forecasting. If turns in employment lag turns in hours in part because of
belated realization of cyclical changes in industry or company activity,
increased awareness and skillful use of economic indicators might con-
ceivably shorten this lag and prevent companies from continuing hiring
and lay-off policies after circumstances warrant a reversal. However,
despite current progress in this field, forecasting remains speculative. We
cannot expect important changes in the hours-employment leads to origi-
nate from this quarter. Sharpened foresight and wise economic policies
may tend to reduce the severity of business cycles, and consequently, of
labor input fluctuations. However, such reductions would be unlikely to
affect the lead of average hours over employment in its role as an indicator
of economic change, since hours have led during both severe and mild
cycles.
Altogether, although there are factors which may tend to limit the
flexibility of hours of work, the lead of weekly hours over employment
turns wifi probably be maintained in the foreseeable future, and with it
the importance of the length of the workweek as an indicator of cyclical
change.
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